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This article looks at the bases, objectives and results of the
“lateral” trade policy adopted by Chile in the 1990s. In particular,
it seeks to give a clearer idea of the role of bilateral agreements
and to incorporate into the discussion the empirical evidence
observed in the case of Chile. It concludes that the criticisms
levelled at this policy, especially by those who advocate unilateral
trade openness rather than other options, are based on an incom-
plete analysis of basic international trade theory. It is therefore
argued   that the   economic concepts taken into account in
evaluating the economic and political rationality of this strategy
must be expanded to acknowledge the complementarity of
the available options and to incorporate the analysis of game
theory, the existence of economies of scale, the transaction costs
existing in the functioning of international markets, and for-
eign  policy elements.  Through  this multidimensional strategy,
Chile has sought to overcome various problems and to stimulate
the areas of its economy which have been most dynamic in
the 1990s: exports of products with greater added value, services
and capital. By traditional standards of appraisal, the results
obtained do not reflect any negative impacts but they do show
positive effects.






Chile has been one of the Latin American coun-
tries which has promoted one of the most active
policies of bilateral trade agreements during the
1990s, based on both foreign policy and eco-
nomic considerations. This experience differs
from the integration policies promoted from the
1960s onwards in three respects: i) it is based on
the signing of broad free trade agreements within
the framework of an outward-looking development
policy rather than the creation of common markets or
customs unions; ii) with varying degrees of success,
the agreements have stimulated the inclusion of the
different dimensions of trade, thus reflecting the
greater complexity of the international economic re-
lations of today, and iii) the efforts to conclude agree-
ments are not limited to the countries of the region,
although these are given priority (especially in the
case of the members of the Latin American Integra-
tion Association (ALADI): efforts have also been
made to progress in integration with the United States
and Canada, the Asia-Pacific economies, and the
European Union. This is an acknowledgement of the
geographical diversification of Chile’s economic
links.
This policy has  not been  free from criticisms
based on various arguments, especially in the area of
trade policies. In the context of the discussions on the
proposal to reduce tariffs from 11% to 6% over a
period of five years, which was approved by Con-
gress, however, a group of economists of various po-
litical beliefs argued in favour of the proposal for a
uniform tariff reduction presented by the government,
pointing out that this would correct serious distor-
tions in the prevailing tariff scheme and allow the
country to improve its linkages with the international
economy and adding that the signing of a consider-
able number of trade agreements had caused the uni-
form 11% tariff to develop in practice into a highly
differentiated tariff resulting in negative effective
protection for some sectors and a level of protection
considerably greater than 11% for others (El Mercu-
rio, 1998).
This discussion is similar to that which took
place in the early 1990s about the type of trade policy
that the United States Government should follow in
order to promote greater trade openness. Lawrence
Summers, the present Under-Secretary of the Treas-
ury of the United States, stated with respect to this
dispute that there should be unquestionable support
for all lateral reductions in trade barriers, whether
they be multi-, uni-, tri– or pluri-lateral (Frankel,
1997). By that he meant that the discussion was not
particularly relevant: what was important was to take
advantage of the trade opportunities that presented
themselves, and in that respect all “lateral” initiatives
were good.
There are two important aspects underlying the
public debate in Chile: i) a sufficiently representative
number of economists reject differentiated tariffs and
their effects, and ii) a policy of unilateral openness is
to be preferred over other options.
The purpose of the present paper is to set forth
the bases and objectives of the “lateral” trade policy
followed by Chile since 1990. In order to do this, we
will  analyse the  aspect of unilateral  openness, ex-
plaining the justification for the policy options fol-
lowed since the restoration of democracy in Chile.1 In
particular, an effort will be made to clarify the role
that bilateral agreements have played and still
play in the trade policy of the governments of the
Democratic Coalition, so as to further a better under-
standing of the objectives pursued, which are at once
economic and political, and to incorporate into the
discussion the empirical information applicable to the
Chilean case which has been accumulated so far in
this respect.
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 The authors wish to express their gratitude for the valuable
comments made on a previous version of this article by Alicia
Frohmann, Patricio Leiva, Raúl E. Sáez, and staff members of
the Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacion-
ales (DIRECON) of the Ministry of External Relations of Chile.
1 For an analysis of the period of President Patricio Aylwin, see
Sáez, Salazar and Vicuña, 1995.
II
The role of economic agreements
and trade policy options
The main conclusions that economic theory offers on
trade policy hold that unilateral openness is the best
policy for a small country like Chile, since it helps to
ensure better resource allocation and hence maxi-
mizes the well-being of the community as a whole. It
has been recognized by economists of different politi-
cal persuasions that the unilateral openness policy ap-
plied  by Chile since the mid-1970s  has helped  to
achieve rapid growth of its exports, both traditional
and non-traditional, while at the same time stimulat-
ing greater diversification in terms of products and
market destinations.2 An equally important factor was
the role played by the State in the 1960s and 1970s in
establishing incentives of different types which helped
to reduce the risks of exporting and thus helped to cre-
ate an endogenous trade development process.3
The governments  of the Democratic Coalition
have recognized the validity  of  this argument and
have promoted and enhanced the unilateral openness
process. Thus, in 1991 tariffs were reduced on an
across-the-board basis from 15% to 11%, and Con-
gress recently approved a further reduction of 5 per-
centage points over a period of five years. As a result,
the uniform tariff applicable to imports from the
countries with which Chile has not signed free trade
agreements will be only 6%: the lowest level in the
last four decades.4
However, the Democratic Coalition has made
still further efforts to secure greater openness in areas
that affect trade from other dimensions: in particular,
in the telecommunications sector it has promoted
broad deregulation and introduced greater competi-
tion, and in financial  matters it has expanded  the
available field of business while at the same time
improving the supervision of banks, insurance com-
panies and securities. The private sector has begun
to invest in the public infrastructure. Finally, the
process of privatization of public enterprises has con-
tinued, with  special attention  to ensuring transpar-
ency and protection of the interests of the State in this
process. In such an important area as intellectual
property rights, in 1991 Chile became the first Latin
American country to grant protection for pharmaceu-
tical products. The government has also ratified im-
portant international treaties such as the Paris
Convention (in 1991) and the international agreement
for the protection of plant varieties (in 1996). In the
area of foreign investment, it has signed numerous
agreements for the promotion and protection of in-
vestments, thus giving a clear sign of the stability of
its policies.
In  short, the process of  greater openness pro-
moted by the governments of the Democratic Coali-
tion cannot be evaluated solely in the light of the
traditional trade parameters (tariff reduction and
elimination of non-tariff measures), but must also be
understood in the context of the whole set of ele-
ments making up the new dimensions of trade policy.
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2 See, for example, Wisecarver (ed.), 1992, and Meller, 1996.
3 See the comments by Meller, 1996, and the studies by Sáez
(1994a and b).
4 It should be added that the Chilean trade regime is marked by
the absence of non-tariff barriers and other types of additional
protection mechanisms (except for a very limited number of ag-
ricultural products). If we take into account the agreements
already in force, then the tariff rate will be substantially lower.
III
The role of economic agreements
1. What role has been played by the
international economic agreements
negotiated by Chile?
The international multilateral, plurilateral and bilat-
eral economic agreements have complemented and
completed the process of unilateral openness in the
aspects in which this process cannot of itself inter-
vene or take decisions.
This assertion may be examined in the light of
the specific case of a “minor” non-traditional export
product: fresh and frozen scallops. In the late 1980s,
after substantial investments in the north-central area
of Chile, the export of such shellfish began to be
developed, with 60% to 70% of the exports going to
the French market. In 1993, however, the French
Government decided that scallops from Chile (and
other areas) were not the same as the French ones,
and it imposed a labelling and marketing regulation
whereby only scallops of the species Pecten could be
sold as “coquille Saint-Jacques”. All others, includ-
ing the Chilean product, must be sold as “pétoncle”,
which French consumers associated with a product of
lower quality and price. This “scientific” classifica-
tion artificially affected the conditions of competi-
tion, giving rise to a concealed form of protection of
the French product, which maintained its position in
the market, while adversely affecting the Chilean
product.
After the failure of diplomatic approaches and
private-sector efforts, the Chilean Government re-
sorted to the Dispute Settlement Body of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), on the grounds that this
regulation was a form of arbitrary discrimination
which sought to protect French producers.
Although the case was finally settled through di-
rect negotiations which corrected this distortion, the
existence of this obligatory, independent and binding
machinery provided for in the WTO promoted a satis-
factory solution which the diplomatic approaches of a
small country had not been able to secure. Obviously,
this is not the only example of such a situation; men-
tion may also be made of the restrictions on fresh
apples imposed by the European Economic Commu-
nity in 1993 and the restrictions on exports of to-
bacco imposed by the United States in 1993, both of
which were settled in the context of the former
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).5
2. What lessons may be drawn from these
experiences?
The first lesson is that international trade does not
take place in a vacuum: the possibilities of taking full
advantage of its benefits do not depend only on the
domestic policies adopted by a country, but also, and
fundamentally, on those adopted by its trading part-
ners.
The second lesson is that one of the main func-
tions of international agreements is to correct market
failures that unilateral openness cannot correct itself.
They are  designed to  reduce the  transaction costs
faced by private agents when taking investment deci-
sions. The economic literature defines transaction
costs as the costs of measuring the value of the attrib-
utes of the goods which are being traded and the
costs of protecting rights and monitoring and enforc-
ing agreements.6 In the opinion of Coase (1988),
without the concept of transaction costs, which is
largely absent from current economic theory, it is im-
possible to  understand the  functioning  of  the eco-
nomic system, usefully analyse many of its problems,
or establish a basis for policy formulation.
International economic relations suffer, among
other problems, from asymmetrical information;
market flaws and uncertainty (such as lack of knowl-
edge of market conditions and of laws which affect
trade and the stability of mutual trade); lack of trans-
parency; and the existence of permanent incentives to
depart from certain patterns of behaviour (as for
example through the proliferation of protectionist
pressures). All these problems increase the cost of
operating in international markets.
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5 It must be  admitted that the  solutions  reached do  not fully
satisfy the aspirations of Chile, but they have allowed the eco-
nomically acceptable continuation of these activities
6 For other definitions, see Dixit, 1996.
Agreements have two essential functions. Firstly,
they contribute to mutual trade openness which
makes it possible to take advantage of the benefits of
trade. In this context, game theory provides the eco-
nomic bases for agreeing on trade openness between
countries. This case is a simple example of the appli-
cation of the prisoner’s dilemma: the ideal world for
a country A is to cause country B to dismantle its
trade barriers, while maintaining its own barriers, but
finally both country A and country B decide to main-
tain their respective barriers, which is the worst pos-
sible result for both of them in terms of well-being.
Trade negotiations of all types open up opportunities
for ongoing co-operation once countries have identi-
fied their preferred joint strategies, but in order to
construct this trading space mechanisms are needed
to identify and punish “fraud”.
Secondly, agreements are designed to reduce the
transaction costs of international economic relations,
especially in view of their current multidimensional
nature, since they provide a set of rules applicable to
the members which ensure stability, stimulate trans-
parency through specific obligations, and ensure the
fulfillment of the rules through binding instruments
which reduce the incentives to depart from them.
Charles Kindleberger has described this latter func-
tion as the provision of international-level public
services because these are a necessary “good” for the
stability of commercial transactions and if they did
not exist this would bring us to a situation similar to
that experienced by the world in the 1930s.
We thus see that international agreements pro-
mote trade through at least two mechanisms: i) the
elimination and regulation of trade barriers through
the provision of a framework for co-operation, and
ii) the reduction of transaction costs. Both these as-
pects, as well as those of a political nature, are usu-
ally ignored in the public debate in Chile on the
rationality of the government’s strategy with regard
to trade agreements. As Coase (1988) notes, it is
necessary to  introduce explicit  positive transaction
costs into economic analysis in order to be able to
study the world as it actually exists.
But if we already have the WTO, which is a mul-
tilateral institution with over 130 member countries,
then what is the point of negotiating bilateral eco-
nomic agreements? The answer to this question in-
volves not only economic but also political elements.
IV
The multilateral trade system
From the point of view of Chile, the multilateral trade
system represented by the WTO is the international
economic negotiation forum par excellence, since
most of Chile’s main trading partners participate in
it.7 In this case, not being a member of the WTO is
simply not a viable alternative. Negotiations in this
environment represent the best possible option  for
Chile and offer the greatest benefits because they are
at a multilateral level, do not involve trade diversion,
and reduce the transaction costs with a broad group
of trading partners operating under common rules:
Chile benefits from the economic concessions  ex-
changed among the members of WTO regardless of
their size and relative weight and their level of devel-
opment. However, this institution also has a number
of limitations and imperfections, and some of the
latter stem from its own multilateral nature.
The last round of multilateral negotiations, and
the most important in this century, was the Uruguay
Round of GATT (ECLAC, 1994). This round, which
concluded in December 1993, enabled over 120
countries to arrive at an ambitious set of agreements,
thanks to which Chile’s links with  the rest of the
world have been  further strengthened, and gave a
strong boost to the rights and duties laid down in the
system, especially non-discrimination, national treat-
ment and the most-favoured-nation clause.
However, the negotiations were highly complex
–the longest in the history of GATT– and often in-
volved great difficulties. Indeed, they were originally
supposed to have ended in December 1990, but this
did not occur and between 1990 and 1993 there was
great uncertainty about what was really going to
happen to the multilateral trade system which had
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7 The absence of the Chinese People’s Republic and Russia is
a serious defect which needs to be corrected as quickly as possi-
ble.
been developed around GATT since 1948. Academics
of different schools of thought wrote books warning
of the trade wars that were likely to break out be-
tween the United States, Japan and the European
Union  (Thurow, 1991;  Krugman, 1996;  Bhagwati,
1991).
Furthermore, in this highly uncertain situation,
the United States made a significant turnaround in its
trade policy, embarking on an active policy of bilat-
eral trade negotiations (Israel, 1985; Canada, 1989,
and NAFTA, 1992). Leaving behind the approach
taken   since the   Second World War, the European
Union negotiated and signed the Maastricht Treaty
(1992), the most important since the Rome Treaty,
and continued to incorporate new members (Frankel,
1997) into what   some authors   called   “Fortress
Europe”. It is worth recalling that the Asia-Pacific
Economic Council (APEC) consolidated its position as
a regional economic forum for the Asia-Pacific
region in those years, especially in 1993 (tables 1
and 2). It has been estimated that 90% of the mem-
bers of WTO belong to some kind of regional agree-
ment (Lawrence, 1996).
In  Latin America, MERCOSUR has become the
main economic integration initiative, with the biggest
scope, and has had considerable effects on trade in
the hemisphere, especially that of Chile, extending
beyond exclusively economic aspects.
The results of the Uruguay Round were highly
significant, strengthening and clarifying rights and
obligations in a significant number of aspects, secur-
ing the incorporation of the agricultural and textiles
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TABLE 1
Main regional agreements, 1957-1996 a
Africa/Middle East Europe Americas Asia-Pacific
1957 1957 - Rome Treaty
1960 1960 - European Free Trade Latin American Free Trade
Association (EFTA) Association (ALALC)
1965 1969 - Andean Pact Australia-New Zealand
1970
1975 Economic Community of 1978 - Association of
West African States South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN)
1980 South African Conference Latin American Integration
Association (ALADI)
1985 1989 - Arab Union of the 1988 -USA-Canada 1985-1987 - ASEAN expands
Maghreb Agreement
1990-1996 1991 -Economic 1991 - European Economic 1991 - MERCOSUR 1992 - South-East Asian
Community of Africa Area (EFTA + EU) 1992 -NAFTA Regional Association
1993 - Maastricht Treaty 1996 - the Andean Pact 1993 - Asia-Pacific
becomes the Andean Economic Council (APEC)
Community
Source: Frankel (1997).
a This is not a complete list.
TABLE 2
Regional agreements notified to the World Trade Organization by its members
(Number of members notifying agreements)
1957-1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1991-1997
30 1 9 7 3 7 14 20 61
Source: WTO.
and clothing sectors into the multilateral rules, and
establishing the first multilateral agreement on trade
in services and on trade-related aspects of intellectual
property. The WTO has provided a serious juridical
framework  for the settlement  of disputes.8 Indeed,
from the time when the WTO came into being up to
27 July 1998, 141 consultations had been requested
under the Understanding Governing the Settlement
of Disputes. It must be admitted, however, that it has
not been possible to make all the progress hoped
for by countries like Chile –for example, with regard
to access to markets for agricultural products or the
dismantling of the trade-distorting Multifibre Agree-
ment– and there are still extensive possibilities for
the application of arbitrary and concealed trade re-
strictions, as well as gaps in terms of trade discipline.
Thus, the speed and depth of the trade openness
that can be achieved at the multilateral level are
limited,  although their strengthening and enhance-
ment continue to be one of Chile’s priorities.
Within this world situation at the beginning of
the 1990s, in which there was a considerable likeli-
hood of entering on a period of international eco-
nomic “disorder”, with conflicts between the
economic powers and the formation of exclusive eco-
nomic blocs (NAFTA, the European Union, the Asia-
Pacific area, MERCOSUR, etc.), and the lower
leadership capacity of the United States in trade mat-
ters was evident, Chile sought a way of “protecting”
and deepening the development scheme adopted over
the last two decades, marked by economic openness
and growth led by external trade. This, together with
foreign policy considerations, explains why Chile
seeks international economic agreements as a com-
plement to its policy of unilateral openness.
This was acknowledged by the WTO itself in its
report on Chilean trade policy prepared in September
1997, in which it said that Chile’s present interest in
regionalism stems from a clear determination not to
be left out of the preferential systems which are being
formed, which would cause it to lose markets, but its
proclaimed intention of making further unilateral
tariff reductions is proof that at the same time it
maintains its commitment to apply free trade policies
based on the most-favoured-nation principle.9
Chile has made the greatest efforts, and has insis-
tently sought opportunities for negotiations, with the
countries or groups of countries with which it trades
most extensively (the United States, MERCOSUR, the
Asia-Pacific area and the European Union) and which
are also those which have undertaken integration
processes with highly significant economic repercus-
sions;10 it has also tried to ensure and expand the
trading possibilities of its production sector and to
avoid being excluded from international trade or try-
ing to protect itself from it.
Fortunately, the most pessimistic scenarios have
not so far materialized: in 1990-1996, international
trade grew by an average of 6% per year, while the
world GDP grew by only 1.5%, but Chile’s exports
increased by 11%. Moreover, studies by the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the WTO itself have recognized that the
spread of regional agreements has been a comple-
ment to multilateral trade openness, or at least has not
affected it adversely.11
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8 See, inter alia, Jackson (1997) and Petersman (1997).
9 See the summary and conclusions in WTO (1997).
10 Thus, although the trade gains from the entry of Chile into
NAFTA or from a bilateral agreement are estimated to be only
small, no estimate has been made of the impact of the fact that
countries whose exports compete with those of Chile may obtain
preferential access to that market, as occurs, of course, with the
countries forming part of the corresponding group and also those
enjoying preferences granted under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) to which Chilean exports do not have access.
Something similar could also occur in the case of an agreement
between MERCOSUR and  the European Union or  between the
latter and South Africa.
11 Partly because rounds of negotiations have taken place at least
once every decade in the context of the multilateral trade system.
See OECD (1995) and WTO (1995).
V
The existing bilateral agreements
and their effects
In order to analyse the bases underlying the “lateral”
trade policy that Chile has followed it is necessary to
address four different but inter-related questions:
What type of agreements should be negotiated? With
which countries should Chile negotiate? What are the
objectives pursued? And what appraisal may be made
of the agreements?
In answering these questions, it should be noted
that the agreements which have been negotiated do
not solve all the problems faced. Nor are they perfect.
In many aspects they have been unsatisfactory, and
an effort has been made to correct this with new pro-
posals for improving and deepening them. The pre-
sent agreements have indeed progressed in the
direction of promoting free trade, however (table 3).
1. What type of agreements should be
negotiated?
Economic theory does not give a completely satisfac-
tory or unambiguous answer to this question.
Dornbusch (1993) says that “In the area of trade
policy a good dose of common sense must fill the gap
left by an absence of hard theory that might otherwise
set the guideposts”. In this sense, there are criteria on
what trade agreements should not do: i) they should
not divert trade (a criterion already expressed by
Jacob Viner in 1950) and ii) they should maintain
the volume of trade of their members with regard to
the rest of the world and increase the volume of trade
among their members (Kemp and Wan’s theorem),
that is to say, they should not create additional
trade barriers with respect to third countries: this rule
ensures that the agreements are reflected in an in-
crease in overall social well-being.
A second aspect which is not addressed by eco-
nomic theory is what the content of the negotiations
should be. When Viner (1950) wrote his study distin-
guishing between the effects of creation and diver-
sion of trade (which has served as a guide for the
research since then) the agreements to which he re-
ferred were fundamentally in respect of tariffs and, to
a lesser extent, non-tariff measures (quotas, licenses,
contingents, prohibitions, etc.). In the present context,
however, the agenda for  the negotiations  is much
broader and more complex and refers to the need to
negotiate “all aspects affecting trade”. In this context,
since the Tokyo Round of GATT in 1974-1979 there
has been a clear tendency to address new aspects of
trade: technical barriers, government purchases, anti-
dumping duties, subsidies and countervailing duties.
The Rome Treaty, NAFTA and the results of the Uru-
guay Round represented a step forward by incorpo-
rating new   issues such   as services, intellectual
property, and some aspects of investments. The pres-
sure to incorporate matters relating to the environ-
ment and labour rights has been less successful,
although these matters are very much present in the
current trade agenda.
Chile has recognized this multidimensional as-
pect by promoting the incorporation of most of the
aspects relating to trade in the negotiations which it
carries out, but it has done so with a good deal of
realism. Thus, the current treaty with Canada incor-
porates the highest rights and duties so far registered
in free-trade agreements signed by Chile in respect of
services and investments, but it does not incorporate
such aspects as intellectual property, technical stand-
ards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, govern-
ment purchases, etc., because when negotiating the
agreement both  countries considered that the WTO
rules, together with their own respective legislations,
already addressed these matters satisfactorily.
On the other hand, the Treaty recently negotiated
with Mexico does incorporate these aspects, because
in the bilateral relations with that country these ques-
tions are important (the current problems of access to
Mexico are connected with matters of this type, such
as technical standards).
The realism with which this strategy has been
approached also takes into account the fact that not
all Chile’s potential trading partners are interested in
going beyond what was achieved in WTO regarding
the incorporation of all dimensions of trade, or else
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they are simply not in a position to do so, because of
institutional or other weaknesses.
2. With which countries should Chile
negotiate?
Economic theory has not been able to formulate a
simple rule or recommendation, in terms of social
well-being, regarding the countries that should be cho-
sen as partners in a bilateral agreement (Srinivasan,
Whalley and Wooton, 1993). For example, it is con-
sidered that the main trading partner of a country is a
natural candidate, but Chile has various “main trad-
ing partners”, depending on the form of aggregation
used. It is also claimed that a country should negoti-
ate with others that have a similar pattern of exports
or imports, as a means of modifying the terms of
trade in its favour, but this is not very feasible for
Chile. Geography plays a very important role in se-
lecting a trading partner: the most recent empirical
information indicates that two countries which have a
common frontier trade 82% more than two similar
countries which are not immediate neighbours. These
estimates also show that a 1% increase in distance
reduces trade by 0.6%, all other things being equal
(Frankel, 1997).
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TABLE 3
Chile: Status of bilateral agreements
Agreement Status Coverage
With Canada Came into force: 5 July 1997 Trade in goods, services and investments.
Tariff elimination programmes under way as
scheduled; process will be completed in 2014
Opening of negotiations on financial services
scheduled for 1999.
With Mexico Came into force: 1 January 1992 Trade in goods.
(ECA No. 17) a Tariff elimination programme completed. New treaty: services, investments, intellectual
The new treaty, incorporating new areas, property, technical obstacles.
will be submitted to Congress shortly. Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures.
Opening of negotiations on financial services, Air transport.
anti-dumping measures and government purchases
scheduled for 1999.
With Venezuela Came into force: 1 July 1993 Trade in goods.
(ECA No. 23) Tariff elimination programme to be completed by Treaty envisages an undertaking to expand trade in
1 January 1999. services.
With Colombia Came into force: 1 January 1994 Trade in goods.
(ECA No. 24) Tariff elimination programme to be completed by Negotiations have been begun to incorporate trade in
1 January 1999. services and investments.
With Ecuador Came into force: 1 January 1995 Trade in goods.
(ECA No. 32) Tariff elimination programme to be completed by Treaty envisages an undertaking to expand trade in
1 January 2000. services.
With Peru Came into force: 1 July 1998 Trade in goods.
(ECA No. 38) Tariff elimination programme under way; to be Treaty envisages an undertaking to expand trade in
completed by 1 January 2012. services.
With MERCOSUR Came into force: 1 October 1996 Trade in goods.
(ECA No. 35) Tariff elimination programme under way; to be Physical integration.
completed by 1 January 2014. Undertaking to negotiate on trade in services.
Participation in institutional structure of
MERCOSUR.
With Bolivia Came into force: 6 April 1993. Partial-Scope Agreement covering a specific number
(ECA No. 22) of products.
It is proposed to expand this agreement to incorporate
more products.
a ECA: Economic Complementation Agreement.
The political dimension, which is recognized in
the economic literature as an important factor for ex-
plaining the formation of regional agreements, has
naturally been present in the case of Chile. Thus,
Foreign Minister Insulza has said that “the economic
complementation and integration agreements which
we have promoted in recent years, although mainly
concerned with trade, can also have implications as
regards increasing the security  of Chile in our re-
gional environment”. These words are also backed up
by the results of empirical studies which estimate
“security externalities”: there are higher levels of
trade between countries which are strategic allies
than between those which are, or consider themselves
to be, adversaries (Mansfield, 1993).
The composition of Chile’s trade with Latin
America, which favours the export of goods with higher
added value, services and investments, together with
the cultural and historical links that exist (also recog-
nized in the economic literature as determinants of
trade)12 and the political dimension already referred
to, explain the priority which Chile has given to the
Latin American region in its trade policy.
3. What are the objectives that have been
pursued?
a) Market access
The policy of negotiating international economic
agreements has been aimed primarily at opening ex-
ternal markets in order to ensure the best possible
development of Chile’s exports. Obviously, unilateral
openness is not necessarily reflected in openness of
the markets of Chile’s trading partners. For example,
it does not necessarily have any effect on their cus-
toms practices or the way they adopt and administer
technical barriers, nor does it eliminate the restrictive
practices applied by countries through the adoption
of anti-dumping measures. Through agreements,
however, it is possible to achieve preferential, assured
and predictable openness which facilitates the devel-
opment of export projects.
b) Ensuring access conditions and stability for ex-
ports
Latin America has been marked by unstable eco-
nomic conditions and trade policies. In the 1990s,
however, there  has been  a noteworthy  increase in
trade openness in all dimensions of trade. It has been
possible to safeguard these conditions through bilat-
eral agreements. The following three examples illus-
trate this point. Since 1997, because of its external
financial difficulties, Brazil has been applying restric-
tions on its imports which it also extended to Chile,
Bolivia and the rest of its MERCOSUR partners, but
two of these measures –the restriction on credits to
finance imports and the application of non-automatic
import licences– have been applied to Chile, Bolivia
and the other MERCOSUR members on special terms
which, although not eliminating their application,
have nevertheless permitted the partial maintenance
of the trade flows in question. For its part, Mexico
raised its tariffs for WTO members after 1993, but
not for Chile. Finally, Colombia recently wanted to
impose restrictions that would  have affected some
Chilean textile exports within the framework of WTO,
but because of its bilateral agreement with Chile it
did not do so. There are some cases –for example, in
connection with MERCOSUR– which it has  not yet
been possible to settle satisfactorily, but the frame-
work for settling them does exist.
c) Eliminating trade barriers that it would be hard
to remove in any other way
The multinational trade system has certain rules
regarding negotiations which can inhibit the bargain-
ing power of small countries like Chile. Thus, for
example, the most-favoured-nation clause, which is a
pillar of the system whereby Chile has benefitted from
conditions of greater openness negotiated by other
countries, is also to some extent a limiting factor: as
Chile, in some cases, is not an important world-level
producer of certain goods, its scope for bargaining is
narrow (the “major supplier” and “substantial inter-
est” rule).
This may be illustrated with a concrete example.
There are currently three companies that assemble
motor  vehicles in  Chile: General  Motors, Peugeot
and Renault (the latter firm also produces some parts
and components). The agreement between Chile and
Mexico opens up the export of vehicles to that mar-
ket on favourable conditions, outside the provisions
of its motor industry legislation: the rules of origin
are much simpler than those of NAFTA, and since 1996
trade between these two countries has been completely
free. Chilean exports of vehicles to Mexico increased
from US$ 7,500 in 1995 to US$ 105,000 in 1996,
US$ 33 million in 1997, and US$ 29 million in the
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 • A P R I L 1 9 9 994
CHILE AND ITS “LATERAL” TRADE POLICY  SEBASTIÁN SÁEZ AND JUAN GABRIEL VALDÉS S.
12 See the estimates in Frankel, 1997.
first half of 1998. The elimination of these barriers
would not have been possible for Chile in a multilat-
eral negotiation, because Chile is not a major pro-
ducer in the world market. Bilateral negotiation,
however, stimulated exports in a way that unilateral
openness could not have achieved.
d) Progressing in all dimensions of trade
The Uruguay Round negotiations sought to in-
corporate a significant number of new dimensions
into the multilateral rules which had been in force
since the creation of GATT in 1947. Although the re-
sults have been very noteworthy, there are neverthe-
less a number of weak points. The complexity which
is added to trade negotiations by the incorporation of
more dimensions, many of them of a sensitive nature,
strengthens the idea that there might be better pros-
pects of satisfactorily settling these kinds of difficul-
ties on a bilateral basis.
Consequently, a first objective is to promote and
protect  Chile’s investments abroad, the  exports of
services normally associated with them, and also
those which are not associated with investments.
Thus, for example, within  the framework of these
agreements it has been possible to further and con-
solidate measures to ensure that Chilean shipowners
can have unrestricted access to bilateral freight, as
well as to cargos to and from third countries, in
the area of maritime transport. Recently, within the
context of the negotiations on the new treaty with
Mexico, the indirect restriction on the transport of
vehicles, which benefitted Mexican shipowners, was
eliminated, so that Chileans and Mexicans are now
subject to the same conditions. This controversy had
dragged on since 1991.
Another important issue for Chile is the possibil-
ity of eliminating the application of anti-dumping du-
ties. This objective, which is very difficult to attain at
the multilateral level, was achieved in the negotia-
tions with Canada, and it is hoped to do the same
with Mexico in the near future. Such advances repre-
sent an example for the hemispheric trade negotia-
tions which are currently under way.
e) Protecting and stabilizing market access
The existence of programmes of unilateral pref-
erences which discriminate against some exports; the
implementation of NAFTA (or the negotiation of bilat-
eral agreements by  the United States) in countries
whose exports compete with those of Chile in the
United States market; the negotiation of agreements
between the European Union and MERCOSUR or
South Africa, and indeed the formation of MERCOSUR
itself, are events which could be very unfavourable
for Chilean exports, because of their effects in terms
of trade diversion or loss of competitiveness in those
markets. Chile seeks to avoid such effects by main-
taining at least the same conditions of access as those
enjoyed by its most direct competitors.
f) Promoting exports of manufactures and services
The composition of Chile’s trade with the Latin
American countries is different from that of its trade
with the rest of the world. Chile’s exports to the re-
gion include products of greater added value and
more stable prices, and the bilateral agreements make
it  possible to  take  advantage of the economies of
scale offered by a broader market and to incorporate
more employment, technology and innovation, which
are central elements in economic development, pro-
vided that the rules of origin are simple and are
aimed at the creation and not the diversion of trade.
Another of the features of Chile’s links with the
region is the importance of exports of services. The
complexity of negotiations  in  this  field is  signifi-
cantly reduced when a smaller number of countries
are involved.
4. What appraisal may be made of the
agreements?
In order to answer this question it is necessary first
of all to highlight the fact that preferential access to
markets totalling almost 500 million persons has re-
sulted in the expansion and diversification of Chile’s
exports (table 4).
These agreements operate in macroeconomic and
international economic environments which are a re-
ality that must be taken into account but whose ef-
fects the agreements are designed to relieve. At the
beginning of the 1990s, the growth prospects for the
countries of the region appeared to be very promis-
ing, but since 1994 they have suffered from various
problems which have affected their macroeconomic
performance. We may  recall, for example, the so-
called “tequila effect” of the Mexican crisis, the ad-
justment problems of the Brazilian and Argentine
economies, and the political and economic instability
which have prevailed in recent years in Colombia,
Venezuela and Ecuador.
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This, together with the evolution of the relative
exchange rates of Chile and these countries, explains
on the one hand why Chile has not been able to take
advantage of all the new options. On the other hand,
however, it means that when this situation, which has
not been linked to the Asian crisis but to the eco-
nomic reforms undertaken, has been overcome, Chile
will have a context of trade preferences which it will
be able to use to advantage.
The present Asian crisis also gives some indica-
tions of how trade with the countries of that region
has behaved. Thus, exports to the countries with
which there are trade agreements grew by 8% in the
first six months of 1998, although total exports to the
Asia-Pacific area fell by 11.4%. Obviously, this
growth cannot be attributed entirely to the existence
of the agreements, but largely to the way the crisis
has hit and the composition of trade with these part-
ners.13 However, the dynamism of this trade does in-
dicate the importance of having a privileged relation-
ship in these markets.
The evaluations of Chile’s agreements with
MERCOSUR, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela (see
Meller and Donoso, 1998, and Meller and Misraji,
1998) give grounds for optimism. If we look at the
effects in terms of trade diversion and creation, which
is the criterion used for measuring the impact of the
agreements on well-being, the figures indicate that
the amount of trade diversion was very small but the
creation of trade was very significant in some sectors.
As noted earlier, this criterion is limited because it
concentrates on the effects of eliminating tariff barri-
ers but does not take account of other dimensions of
trade included in these agreements.14 In particular, it
cannot measure the reduction in transaction costs
deriving from the greater certainty and transparency
of the trade regimes prevailing in these markets or
the expansion in trade linked with the process of
outward-oriented investment.
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 • A P R I L 1 9 9 996
CHILE AND ITS “LATERAL” TRADE POLICY  SEBASTIÁN SÁEZ AND JUAN GABRIEL VALDÉS S.
TABLE 4
Chile: Trade and investment, by agreements signed or on negotiating agenda
(Millions of dollars)
Andean United Central Asia- EuropeanYear Commu- MERCOSURb Mexico Canada c Pacific Total
nity a States America area d Union
Exports of goods
1990 304.6 652.0 57.7 56.2 1 469.2 12.9 2 159.8 3 279.8 8 580.3
1993 566.8 1 089.2 130.8 61.1 1 655.2 54.4 2 839.7 2 544.5 9 416.2
1997 1 118.8 1 863.1 376.3 131.0 2 710.5 96.9 5 629.0 4 146.6 17 024.8
Imports of goods
1990 506.3 1 124.0 100.8 224.3 1 373.4 4.4 915.4 1 882.4 7 023.4
1993 454.7 1 761.0 209.7 203.1 2 477.4 19.4 1 853.8 2 312.3 10 629.6
1997 914.2 3 193.2 1 076.2 432.5 4 332.6 79.7 2 905.3 3 957.0 18 111.6
Foreign Direct Investment e
1990 1.5 6.1 - 252.9 270.9 - 56.7 328.7 1 320.4
1993 7.5 59.3 0.4 480.5 623.7 - 97.6 193.2 1 729.8
1997 26.6 94.7 9.9 678.8 913.4 - 181.8 2 181.0 5 041.2
Chilean direct investment f
1990 - 13.9 - - - - - - 15.9
1993 55.3 616.1 2.5 - - - - - 2 795.1
1997 1 014.7 3 545.8 18.0 - 75 - 30 - 4 730.9
Source: Prepared on the basis of data from the Department of Economic Studies of DIRECON.
a Chile has some form of Economic Complementation Agreement (ECA) with all the member countries of this group (see table 3).
b Comprises figures for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
c Comprises figures for Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
d Comprises the APEC economies, excepting the United States, Canada and Mexico.
e Investment made under D.L. 600. Does not include figures for investment made under Chap. XIV, which is a mode of investment
frequently used by countries from the Latin American region.
f Investment officially detected.
13 It should be recalled that exports of copper and of the fisheries
sector had the greatest incidence in the reduction in the amounts
exported, because of the effect of the drop in international
prices.
Another criterion used by economic theory for
evaluating trade agreements (Kemp and Wan, 1976)
is the following: when trade among the members of
an agreement expands and their trade with the rest
of the world either remains constant or increases
(i.e., no obstacles are created for the trade of third
countries) there is a clear increase in well-being both
for the members of the agreement and for the non-
members. If we look at what happened before the
Asian crisis in Chile’s trade with its trading partners
and with the rest of the world, we see that in global
terms Chile’s trade has continued  to expand, both
with the countries with which it has signed agree-
ments and with the rest of the world.15
With regard to the composition of Chilean ex-
ports, the studies indicate that the agreements have
promoted or at least maintained exports of goods
with high levels of added value. This has been one of
the main concerns of the governments of the Demo-
cratic Coalition. But the increase in exports of high
added value has also been accompanied by an in-
crease in traditional Chilean exports and exports of
agricultural products which, in some cases, were not
being exported because of the various barriers affect-
ing their possibilities of access to foreign markets
(for example, phytosanitary barriers).
Estimation of  the economic impact of a trade
agreement is an extremely complex exercise from the
technical point of view, and the results obtained de-
pend very much on the assumptions taken as the basis
of the calculations.
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997) have
evaluated the various trade policy options open to
Chile and their impact on social well-being as meas-
ured in terms of a percentage of annual GDP (table 5).
The options correspond to an “additive” strategy, that
is to say, one which takes account of the effect on
social well-being of the incorporation of new agree-
ments. The possibilities evaluated in the table are:
agreement with MERCOSUR; agreement with NAFTA;
NAFTA plus MERCOSUR; NAFTA plus MERCOSUR and
the European Union; NAFTA plus MERCOSUR, the
European Union and the rest of South America; and
finally, agreements with Canada and Mexico plus
MERCOSUR, the European Union and the rest of South
America. These authors also examine the impact
these policy options would have if certain products
are excluded (such as sensitive agricultural products)
and if the most-favoured-nation tariff is reduced from
11% to 6%.
The main conclusions to be drawn from table 5
may be summarized as follows: the best option is to
include all products in the agreements –i.e., that there
should be no exclusions– which is the policy that
Chile has been applying. The best strategy is to sign
agreements with as many trading partners as possible
in order to avoid the costs arising from trade diver-
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TABLE 5
Chile: Estimate of gains in well-being from trade agreements
(As percentages of GDP)
NAFTA, Canada and
NAFTA NAFTA, MERCOSUR, Mexico,
Product coverage MERCOSUR NAFTA and MERCOSUR, European MERCOSUR,
MERCOSUR and European Union and European Union
Union rest of South and rest of
America South America
No exceptions -0.43 1.04 1.48 5.24 8.4 8.16
With exceptions -0.43 1.04 1.48 2.02 2.48 0.44
With exceptions and 6% tariff 0.35 1.70 2.01 2.29 2.66 0.87
Agricultural products excluded
only in agreement with
European Union -0.43 1.04 1.48 2.02 5.48 3.90
Agricultural products excluded
only in agreement with
European Union, and 6% tariff 0.35 1.70 2.01 2.29 5.71 4.44
Source: Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997).
14 Nor does it consider questions such as the existence of econo-
mies of scale (Pomfret, 1997).
15 It should be repeated once again that this conclusion concerns
trade as a whole; it does not pretend to be a generalization at the
sectoral level, where the situation may be different. For a
sion; it might be said that this backs up the strategy of
open regionalism supported by the Government of
Chile. In a situation like that described, excluding the
United States does not have a significant impact on
well-being. When the possibility of excluding certain
products is considered, however, the presence or ab-
sence of the United States becomes very important.
Finally, the table indicates that if only the agreement
with the European Union excludes agricultural
products, the effect on well-being is greater than in
the option in which all the agreements exclude this
type of products, because of the importance that
non-cereal agricultural products have for Chile in a
bilateral agreement with the United States.
VI
Conclusions
In this article we have examined the bases, objec-
tives and results of the “lateral” trade policy
adopted by Chile since the beginning of the 1990s.
The criticisms which have been levelled at this
strategy are based on a limited analysis of the theo-
retical bases of international trade. In this paper we
argue that in order to evaluate the economic and
political rationality of this strategy it is important
to broaden the economic concepts by acknow-
ledging the complementarity that exists between
the available options and incorporating into the
analysis game theory, the existence of economies
of scale, the transaction costs involved in the func-
tioning of international markets, and also foreign
policy elements.
The aim of this multidimensional strategy has
been to overcome the problems referred to earlier and
to stimulate the most dynamic economic activities of
the Chilean economy during the 1990s: exports of
goods with higher added value, services and capital.
Using traditional parameters of appraisal, the re-
sults obtained have not shown any negative effects
but they have registered clear positive effects.
(Original: Spanish)
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